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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The number of HIV patients needing medication will continue to rise 
beyond the year 2015.1  The cost of HIV medication will also increase.2  The 
increase in both the number of patients and the cost of treatment will challenge 
the ability of nations to provide adequate access to medicines.3  Providing for 
better access, compulsory licensing4 allows for the production of patented 
pharmaceuticals at a lower cost to the consumer.5  Although countries issue 
compulsory licenses for domestic production,6 there is only one successful 
example of exportation of medication under a compulsory license: the license 
issued by the Canadian government for pharmaceuticals exported to Rwanda.7  
Allowing for the exportation of medication under a compulsory license is vital 
because not all countries have the ability to manufacture pharmaceuticals.8  
                                                                                                                                     
1 See ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON AIDS, THE TREATMENT TIMEBOMB 6–8 (2009), 
http://www.aidsportal.org/repos/APPGTimebomb091.pdf (noting that the rise in patients needing 
treatment will be due to a variety of factors, including people starting treatment earlier, staying on 
medication longer, and meeting current unmet needs).  
2 Id. at 10–12 (noting that the increase in cost of medications will be due to better medications 
with less side effects, as well as the need for second and third line medications).  
3 Id. at 5: 
We can predict many of the changing treatment needs of people living 
with HIV in the coming decade and they are not compatible with 
treatments and prices available today.  Maintaining HIV treatment to 
keep people alive will cripple developing economies, or place 
unbearable strains on richer countries trying to support them. 
4 A compulsory license, as defined by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), is  
when the authorities license companies or individuals other than the 
patent owner to use the rights of the patent—to make, use, sell or 
import a product under patent (i.e. a patented product or a product 
made by a patented process)—without the permission of the patent 
owner.  Allowed under the WTO’s TRIPS (intellectual property) 
Agreement provided certain procedures and conditions are fulfilled. 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, JULY 2008 PACKAGE: BRIEFING NOTES, JARGON BUSTER (2008), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_brief07_e.htm. 
5 See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct 
Investment: The Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 283–84 (2008) 
(“Developing nations have attempted to resolve this tension through the issuance of patent 
compulsory licenses—authorizations for government-approved generic copies—so that those in 
need of the most important new treatments can obtain them at an affordable price.”). 
6 See Jamie Feldman, Note, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the Current Practice, 
8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 137, 149 (2009) (“High, middle, and low-income nations have all issued 
health related compulsory licenses.”). 
7 See Mark D. Penner & Peter G. Armstrong, Removing Barriers? An Overview of the 
Canadian Access to Medicines Regime, 21 I.P.J. 357, 360 (2009).  
8 See Jessica L. Greenbaum, Comment, TRIPs and Public Health: Solutions for Ensuring 
Global Access to Essential AIDS Medication in the Wake of the Paragraph 6 Waiver, 25 J. 
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Despite this example, the Canadian Access to Medicines Regime (“CAMR”),9 
Canada’s compulsory licensing scheme, is underutilized.10  Recently, Bill C-
393,11 in the Canadian House of Commons and its complementary bill in the 
Senate, Bill S-232,12 were brought before the Canadian Parliament.  These bills 
propose to streamline the implementation of CAMR.13 
This paper highlights the significant changes to CAMR proposed by this 
recent legislation.  These changes reflect an attempt to remedy the problems of 
the current regime, but in doing so they create broader rights that are not 
compliant with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights14 (TRIPs Agreement).15  Section II of this paper discusses the international 
                                                                                                                                     
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 142, 151 (2008) (“Although ninety percent of those infected with 
the HIV/AIDS virus live in developing countries, almost eighty percent of these countries do not 
have the means necessary to produce anti-retroviral drugs.”). 
9 The CAMR is part of the Canadian Patent Act and also references the Canadian Food and 
Drugs Act.  Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2 (1985), available at http://laws. 
justice.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01; Canadian Food and Drugs Act, C.R.C., 
ch. 870, §§ C.01.001-C.09.035 (2009), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/F-27/page-
2.html#anchorbo-ga:l_II-gb:s_37. 
10 See George Tsai, Note, Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons For Compulsory 
Licensing Schemes Under the WTO Doha Declaration, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1063, 1080–96 (2009) 
(discussing shortcomings of the regime).  It is possible that such shortcomings have resulted in a 
lack of use of the regime. 
11 Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian 
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, (1st 
reading 25 May 2009), http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId= 
4329904&Language=e&Mode=1.  
12 Bill S-232, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian purposes) 
and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, http://www. 
parl.gc.ca/content/Senate/Bills/402/public/S-232/S-232_1/S-232_text-e.htm. 
13 See House of Commons Debates (12 June 2009) (Ms. Judy Wasylycia-Leis) (Can.), 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=journals&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses
=2&Language=E&DocId=3987263&File=0#Int-2833462 [hereinafter Debates, Wasylycia-Leis]. 
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197–1225, 
[hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
15 See House of Commons Debates (12 June 2009) (Mr. Marc Garneau) (Can.), http://www2. 
parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Pub=journals&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2&Langua
ge=E&DocId=3987263&File=0#Int-2833462 [hereinafter Debates, Garneau] (suggesting that the 
proposed legislation may not be compliant with the TRIPs Agreement). While Mr. Garneau 
discusses TRIPs Agreement compliance issues, he only briefly outlines several areas of concern.  
This paper takes a closer look at the proposed legislation’s compliance with the TRIPs Agreement, 
in the context of complaints brought against the current CAMR regime, in order to illustrate why 
these changes were proposed.  In addition, this paper discusses several positive steps taken by the 
proposed legislation, in contrast to Mr. Garneau’s contentions.  
4
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development of compulsory licenses for exportation, including the TRIPs 
Agreement.  Section III provides an overview of Canada’s current legislation as 
well as Canada’s experiences under such legislation.  As a contrast, India’s 
current compulsory licensing regime is also set out in Section III.  Next, Section 
IV(A) presents the problems encountered under the current Canadian legislation.  
This Section goes on to show how the proposed legislation’s answers to these 
problems are not compliant with the TRIPs Agreement.  However, to dismiss the 
bill in its entirety would be detrimental to creating a working regime, as several of 
the amendments reflect positive changes.  To illustrate these positive changes, 
Section IV(B) compares amendments to other nations’ legislation.  The paper 
concludes by discussing that while the proposed legislation should not pass as it 
stands, the positive changes should guide Canada and other nations in creating 
better medicine regimes. 
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND COMPULSORY LICENSING 
Canada’s current medicines regime is based on international agreements and 
declarations, in particular Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement and the Doha 
Declaration.16  Canada must continue to comply with these agreements in any 
future legislation.17 
Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement sets out basic provisions addressing 
compulsory licensing.18  Provisions include limiting the time and scope of the 
license,19 and allowing for adequate remuneration to the rights holder.20  Article 
31 also requires the party seeking a compulsory license to negotiate with the 
patent holder on reasonable commercial terms.21  This negotiation requirement 
                                                                                                                                     
16 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31, at 1209–10; World Trade Organization, 
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) 
[hereinafter Doha Declaration]; see Tsai, supra note 10, at 1064 (“CAMR is based on and enabled 
by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights . . . which took 
effect January 1, 1995, requiring all WTO member nations to meet minimum standards in their 
laws and practices regarding intellectual property protection.”).  
17 The current CAMR actually goes beyond what is required under the TRIPs Agreement.  See 
Greenbaum, supra note 8, at 158 (“This voluntary license requirement makes the law even more 
rigorous than the standards for compulsory licensing.”).  
18 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31, at 1209–10.   
19 Id. art. 31(c), at 1209. 
20 Id. art. 31(h), at 1210.  
21 Id. art. 31(b), at 1209: 
[S]uch use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed 
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have 
not been successful within a reasonable period of time.  This 
requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of 
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may be waived in two circumstances: (1) a national emergency or (2) public non-
commercial use.22  Article 31 also contains several restrictions on production.23  
These restrictions are the result of tensions between developed and developing 
nations that were present during the negotiations.24  The tension is notably present 
in Article 31, subdivision (f), which restricts production predominantly to supply 
the domestic market.25  This restriction presented a barrier for developing nations 
that lack adequate manufacturing capabilities.26 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) member countries recognized Article 
31(f) as a burden on developing countries when preparing the Doha Declaration.27  
The Doha Declaration states that the TRIPs Agreement “can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”28  
Since Article 31(f) presented a barrier to accessing medicines, the Doha 
Declaration provided that the TRIPs Council should come up with a solution to 
the Article 31(f) problem.29 
                                                                                                                                     
public non-commercial use.  In situations of national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, 
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable.  In the case 
of public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, 
without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to 
know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the 
right holder shall be informed promptly. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. art. 31(c), (f), at 1209–10 (stating, for example, that the use shall be noncommercial and 
limited in scope and duration).  
24 Tsai, supra note 10, at 1067 (discussing the developed nations stance of greater intellectual 
property protection, while developing nations “have argued that the strict limitations of the TRIPS 
Agreement have overly restricted users’ interests in pharmaceutical technology, especially in the 
context of health crises . . . .”).  
25 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(f), at 1210.  
26 See Tsai, supra note 10, at 1068 (discussing how Article 31(f) presented significant barriers 
to developing countries because those with manufacturing capacity cannot recoup production costs 
through exportation and those countries without manufacturing capacity cannot import drugs from 
manufacturing countries).  
27 Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 1. 
28 Id. ¶ 4.  
29 Id. ¶ 6: 
We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face 
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the 
TRIPS Agreement.  We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an 
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General 
Council before the end of 2002. 
6
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In response, the TRIPs Council rendered a decision in 2003 (2003 Council 
Decision).30  The Decision stated that certain countries are eligible to import 
pharmaceuticals under a compulsory license.31  Eligible countries include least 
developed nations, and nations under certain emergency or other limited 
circumstances.32  The Decision also emphasized the narrow scope of the license33 
and implemented certain procedural requirements.  For example, the TRIPs 
Council must be notified when the importing and exporting countries decide to 
use a compulsory license.34  Other requirements regulate special packaging35 and 
state that remuneration to the patent holder only needs to be paid by one of the 
countries.36 
                                                                                                                                     
30 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Decision of the General 
Council: Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003) (on file with author), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm [hereinafter 2003 Council Decision].  
31 Id. ¶ 1(b). 
32 See id. 
33 See id. ¶ 2(b)(i) (noting that the compulsory license should be for “only the amount 
necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing Member(s) may be manufactured under the 
license and the entirety of this production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified 
its needs to the Council for TRIPS . . . .”).  
34 See id. ¶ 2(a) (providing that the importing member must notify the TRIPs Council); Id. ¶ 
2(c) (providing that the exporting member must notify the TRIPs Council).  
35 Id. ¶ 2(b)(ii): 
Products produced under the license shall be clearly identified as being 
produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific 
labeling or marking.  Suppliers should distinguish such products 
through special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the 
products themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and does 
not have a significant impact on price.  
Id. ¶ 2(b)(iii) (“[B]efore shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website . . . the following 
information: the quantities being supplied to each destination as referred to in indent (i) above; and  
the distinguishing features of the product(s) referred to in indent (ii) above . . . .”).  
36 Id. ¶ 3:  
Where a compulsory license is granted by an exporting Member under 
the system set out in this Decision, adequate remuneration pursuant to 
Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be paid in that Member 
taking into account the economic value to the importing Member of the 
use that has been authorized in the exporting Member.  Where a 
compulsory license is granted for the same products in the eligible 
importing Member, the obligation of that Member under Article 31(h) 
shall be waived in respect of those products for which remuneration in 
accordance with the first sentence of this paragraph is paid in the 
exporting Member. 
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In addition to the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Council Decision, WTO 
member nations have debated implementing Article 31bis.37  Article 31bis is an 
amendment to the TRIPs Agreement that would replace the 2003 Council 
Decision.38  Article 31bis would provide a specific regime for the exportation of 
pharmaceuticals under a compulsory license.39  As of the date of this paper the 
amendment is pending, needing the approval of two thirds of the WTO’s 
membership.40  WTO members have until December 31, 2011 to approve the 
amendment.41  The United States was the first to accept Article 31bis on 
December 17, 2005.42  Other countries later followed suit including India and 
Canada.43  Despite the fact that it has not been sufficiently approved, Article 
31bis is the subject of much criticism and political discussion.  Pharmaceutical 
companies lobby against it because of concerns of re-importation.44  Even 
proponents of compulsory legislation criticize Article 31 bis for being too 
complex.45 
Many countries have implemented a compulsory licensing exportation regime 
based on Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement, the Article 31bis amendment and 
the Doha Declaration, including China,46 India47 and Canada,48 with the notable 
                                                                                                                                     
37 Press Release, World Trade Organization, Members OK Amendment to Make Health 
Flexibility Permanent (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm. 
38 Decision of the General Council, Amendment of the TRIPs Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 6, 
2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm.  The specific text 
of Article 31bis can be found in the Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPs Agreement 
section of the amendment. 
39 See id. 
40 World Trade Organization, Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPs Agreement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2010).  
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See id.  
44 See Posting of Shamnad Basheer to Spicy IP, http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2008/01/ 
doha-style-compulsory-licenses-for.html (Jan. 31, 2008, 18:40 IST) (stating that pharmaceutical 
companies are concerned that the compulsory licensing regime will harm their full-price sales, 
through political pressure and re-sales from the original countries of importations).  
45 See id. (noting that proponents of compulsory licensing have criticized the WTO licensing 
regime as time consuming and expensive). 
46 She Ji Gong Gong Jian Kang Wen Ti de Zhuan li Shi Shi Qiang Zhi Xu Ke Zheng Ban Fa 
(Di 37 Hao) [Relating to Public Health Issues, the Implementation of Compulsory Licensing of 
Patented Method (Order No. 37)] (promulgated by the State Intellectual Prop. Office, Nov. 29, 
2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006). 
47 The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005; INDIA CODE (2005), available at http:// 
indiacode.nic.in/. 
48 Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2 (1985), available at http://laws.justice. 
gc.ca/ eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01. 
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exception of the United States.49  Canada and India are the only countries in 
which compulsory licensing for exportation has been attempted.50 
III. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION AND USAGE OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSING 
EXPORTATION REGIME 
In this section, Canada’s and India’s compulsory licensing regimes, and their 
experiences under each regime, are compared.  On a spectrum of compulsory 
licensing provisions, Canada—at one extreme—is too complex, while India—at 
the other extreme—is too vague.51  
A. Complexities in the Current Canadian Access to Medicines Regime 
The Canadian government developed CAMR in 2005, amending both the 
Canadian Patent Act52 and the Canadian Food & Drugs Act.53  The amendment to 
the Patent Act identifies who can apply for a compulsory license, the application 
process, royalty requirements and grounds for termination of the license.54  The 
application process is complex.55  For example, the applicant must negotiate with 
the patent holder for at least thirty days before applying.56  In addition, the 
application itself has numerous requirements.57  CAMR also allows the patent 
                                                                                                                                     
49 In 2006, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced Senate Bill No. 3175: Life-Saving 
Medicines Export Act of 2006 to Congress.  S. 3175, 109th Cong. (2006).  The bill would have 
amended Title 35 of the U.S. Code to grant the exportation of patented pharmaceuticals under a 
compulsory license.  The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, but never became 
law.  Govtrack.us, S. 3175: Life-Saving Medicines Export Act of 2006, http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd? bill=s109-3175 (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (emphasizing the bill was not 
passed after two readings to Congress and was then referred to the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary). 
50 See Emily Ng & Jillian C. Kohler, Finding Flaws: the Limitations of Compulsory Licensing 
for Improving Access to Medicines—an International Comparison, 16 HEALTH L.J. 143, 163–69 
(2008). 
51 See id.  
52 Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2. 
53 Canadian Food and Drugs Act, C.R.C., ch. 870, §§ C.01.001-C.09.035 (2009), http://laws. 
justice.gc.ca/eng/F-27/page-2.html#anchorbo-ga:l_II-gb:s_37. 
54 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2.  Schedules 2, 3 and 4 lay out 
which countries are eligible importers and Section 21.03(1) permits Schedule amendments subject 
to certain criteria.  The application process is discussed in Section 21.04.  The royalty 
requirements are set out in Section 21.08.  The termination of the license is set out in Sections 
21.13 and 21.14.  
55 See Paige E. Goodwin, Right Idea, Wrong Result—Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime, 
34 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 573 (2008).  
56 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.04(3)(c); relevant language, infra APPENDIX, 
at 151. 
57 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.04(2); relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 
150–51. 
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holder to litigate the amount of royalty payments.58  Allowing for litigation 
surrounding royalty payments creates uncertainty with respect to the application 
process.59 
Some of the requirements in the current CAMR go beyond what the TRIPs 
Agreement requires.  For example, CAMR sets a two-year time limit to the 
license60 whereas the TRIPs Agreement requires only that the license be limited 
in duration.61  Also, CAMR provides a schedule of which pharmaceuticals can be 
licensed.62  In contrast, the TRIPs Agreement does not require defining specific 
pharmaceuticals that can be produced under a license,63 but instead the TRIPs 
Council defined pharmaceutical products broadly in their 2003 Council 
Decision.64 
A Canadian government commissioned review of CAMR was published in 
May 2007.65  The review included information from various stakeholders from 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”).66 
Manufacturers of predominantly patented brand name pharmaceuticals, referred 
to as the “innovative pharmaceutical industry” throughout the report, believed that 
many of the CAMR provisions were necessary to adequately protect their rights.67  
In contrast, NGOs and manufacturers of predominantly generic pharmaceuticals 
(“generic companies”) had many suggestions for changing CAMR.  For instance, 
NGOs called for a broadening of the—definition of pharmaceuticals,68 and both 
NGOs and many generic companies suggested an overhaul of the application 
                                                                                                                                     
58 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.08(4); relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 
152.  
59 See Penner & Armstrong, supra note 7, at 373.  
60 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.09; relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 
152.  The two-year time limit may be renewed for another two years pursuant to Section 21.12.  
61 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(c), at 1209 (“[T]he scope and duration of such 
use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor 
technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after 
judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive . . . .”); Goodwin, supra note 55, at 582 
(noting that CAMR goes beyond the TRIPs Agreement with the two-year time limit).  
62 Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, Schedule 1.  
63 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31, at 1209-10; Goodwin, supra note 55, at 579.  
64 See 2003 Council Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 1(a).  
65 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, REPORT ON THE STATUTORY REVIEW OF SECTIONS 21.01 TO 
21.19 OF THE PATENT ACT (2007), http://camr-rcam.hc-sc.gc.ca/review-reviser/ camr_rcam_ 
report_rapport-eng.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 2007 REPORT].  
66 Id. at 6. 
67 See generally id. (analyzing the concerns of “innovative pharmaceutical” companies 
throughout). 
68 Id. at 10 (stating that the list of pre-approved pharmaceutical products eligible for export 
should be eliminated or broadened in order to better meet the needs of developing countries). 
10
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process.69  Although all stakeholders unanimously supported the current royalty 
formula, NGOs and generic companies noted that allowing the patent holder to 
litigate for additional royalties discouraged uptake of CAMR.70  In the end, the 
report concluded that an overhaul of the current regime was unnecessary.71 
B. Complexities in CAMR as Illustrated by the Canadian/Rwandan Experience  
Under CAMR, Canada exported medication to Rwanda using a compulsory 
license.72  Apotex Inc., a Canadian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer, 
attempted to negotiate a voluntary license with three pharmaceutical companies 
holding patents to the HIV/AIDS cocktail Apo TriAvir in May 2007.73  After 
negotiations failed, Apotex applied for and was granted a compulsory license in 
August 2007.74  Both Canada and Rwanda notified the WTO of their intent to use 
a compulsory license for the drug cocktail, as required by the 2003 Council 
Decision and the CAMR application.75  More than a year after this notification, 
Rwanda received its first shipment of generic HIV/AIDS drugs.76 
This example illustrates some of the current problems with CAMR.77  First, 
the cocktail that Apotex wanted to use was not included on CAMR’s schedule of 
drugs.78  Thus, Canada first had to amend the schedule.79  Second, Apotex faced 
problems during the CAMR required negotiations, because CAMR did not clearly 
state what the applicant needed to show.80  More than a year elapsed between 
notification to the WTO and delivery of the drugs, revealing the time consuming 
nature of CAMR, which stems from its complexities, as discussed above.81 
                                                                                                                                     
69 See id. at 13 (proposing several alternatives to the application process). 
70 Id. at 17. 
71 See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 2007 REPORT, supra note 65, at 40; Penner & Armstrong, 
supra note 7, at 376 (noting that the Report’s conclusion of how “the Government should focus on 
non-legislative measures” was mainly due to the fact that Rwanda had applied for a compulsory 
license).  
72 See Tsai, supra note 10, at 1076–80.  
73 Id. at 1078. 
74 Id. at 1079. 
75 Id. 
76 See Shipment Record, Apotex, Rwanda: Apo-Triavir, http://www.apotex.com/apotriavir/ 
product/rwanda_shipments.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2010); Press Release, Apotex, Second 
Shipment of Life-Saving Aids Drug Leaving for Africa (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.apotex. 
com/global/about/press/20090918.asp (stating that a second shipment was sent to Rwanda). 
77 See Tsai, supra note 10. 
78 See id. at 1077.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1078.  
81 See id. at 1079.  
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C. Vagueness in India’s Current Compulsory Licensing Regime 
India amended its patent law to add a compulsory licensing for exportation 
regime in 2005 through the addition of Section 92A.82  The regime is a relatively 
short provision in comparison to CAMR.83  Section 92A allows for a compulsory 
license to be given to any country having “insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacity” under terms set forth by the Indian Controller General of Patents.84  
Unlike CAMR, the Indian provision does not set out a specific schedule of 
pharmaceuticals that can be manufactured, but instead gives a broad definition.85  
In addition, the provision for India does not include certain TRIPs Agreement 
requirements, such as indicating the amount of pharmaceutical product to be 
produced.86  This stands in contrast to CAMR, which provides for such 
requirements in the application process.87  In fact CAMR, as noted above, goes 
beyond the TRIPs Agreement requirements in certain circumstances.88  In 
contrast to CAMR, the Indian regime is vague because of its broad scope and 
silence on certain international require 89ments.   
                                                                                                                                     
82 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2005), available at 
http://indiacode.nic.in/. 
83 See id. 
84 Id. §§ 92(A)(1), 92 (A)(2).  
85 See id. (stating that pharmaceutical product is defined as “[A]ny patented product, or 
product manufactured  through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address 
public health problems and shall be inclusive of ingredients necessary for their manufacture and 
diagnostic kits required for their use”). 
86 See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s 
Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 604 
(2007): 
[I]n contrast with the TRIPS framework, India’s Section 92A is 
completely silent on any obligation of the Indian government or the 
compulsory licensee to specify the amount of pharmaceutical products 
that will be exported, to specially label or mark those products, or make 
public any information about the export by posting to a website or other 
means of publication.  
87 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2 (1985), available at http://laws. 
justice.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01. 
88 See Greenbaum, supra note 8, at 158.  
89 See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 166 (discussing ambiguity in the Indian legislation); 
Mueller, supra note 86, at 604 (discussing the Indian provision’s silence in respect to certain 
TRIPs Agreement requirements). 
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D. Vagueness in Section 92A as Illustrated by the Indian/Nepal Experience 
Natco Pharma Ltd., an Indian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer, applied to 
the Indian government for a compulsory license in September 2007.90  The 
license was requested to produce anti-cancer drugs which would be exported to 
Nepal.91  Pfizer, one of the patent holders, challenged the application in the Indian 
court system, and the court granted Pfizer a hearing.92  In September 2008, Natco 
reportedly withdrew the application.93  Litigation stemming from ambiguities in 
the Indian regime delayed and possibly resulted in blocking the compulsory 
license.94 
Indian and Canadian compulsory licensing schemes are viewed as two 
extremes in a spectrum of licensing provisions.95  The Indian provision can be 
viewed as too vague, and the fact that Natco withdrew the application is an 
indication of this.96  On the other hand, the Canadian regime has been criticized 
as too complex.97  Clearly, reform in this area of patent law is necessary for both 
legal and policy reasons. 
                                                                                                                                     
90 See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 166; see generally Latha Jishnu, Cancer Drug Puts 
License, Patent Rules to Test, BUS. STANDARD, Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.business-standard. 
com/india/storypage.php?autono=310813. 
91 See Posting of Shamnad Basheer to SpicyIP, http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2008/01/ 
roche-vs-natco-indias-first-doha-style.html (Jan. 16, 2008, 16:44 IST) (noting that the application 
specified the amount to be produced, which is not a specified requirement under the Indian 
compulsory licensing provision, Section 92A, but is required under the TRIPs Agreement).  This 
may suggest that while the regime is vague, the implementation of the regime may add 
clarification, at least in certain areas. 
92 See Posting of Shamnad Basheer to SpicyIP, http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2008/09/ 
breaking-news-natco-withdraws-doha.html (Sept. 28, 2008, 23:11 IST).  
93 Id.  
94 See id. (suggesting that Natco may have withdrawn the application out of fear it would lose 
on the merits); Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 168 (noting that it is unclear whether a hearing 
should be granted to the patent holders, as the Indian provision, Section 92A, does not specify that 
this is a right granted under the regime).  
95 See, e.g., Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 163–69. 
96 See generally id. (discussing the vagueness of the Indian regime).  
97 News Release, Jack Kay, President and COO, Apotex, The Apotex Experience with 
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/ 
news/apr_23_07_kay.asp [hereinafter Kay].  This was a presentation by Jack Kay to the Canadian 
House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology.  
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO CAMR 
A. Lack of TRIPS Compliance in the Proposed Changes to CAMR 
This section sets out major changes to CAMR, which propose to streamline 
the compulsory licensing process.98  These changes are in response to criticisms 
levied against the current CAMR.99  The criticisms can be separated into three 
main categories: complexity, balancing of interests, and lack of incentives.  While 
the proposed amendments address these criticisms, they create a regime that is not 
complaint with TRIPs Agreement requirements. 
1. Complexity in the Current CAMR Regime 
Apotex Inc., the Canadian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer, discussed 
problems it had experienced with CAMR before the Canadian House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology.100  Apotex 
President and COO, Jack Kay, noted the complexity of CAMR, stating that the 
requirements were, “impossible to navigate.”101  The complexity of the current 
CAMR regime is also echoed by importing countries.102  Specifically, much of 
the complexity of the current CAMR regime is based on the application 
process.103  Proposed legislation would repeal several CAMR application 
requirements.104  Important changes include deleting the requirement to state the 
maximum quantity of pharmaceuticals that will be produced,105 and repealing the 
need to note information about the version of the pharmaceutical product and 
information regarding the importing country.106  Instead, the amended statute 
would merely require the name of the pharmaceutical product and “any other 
information that may be prescribed.”107  In this way, the proposed amendment 
contains vague language, which may create uncertainty as to what information is 
necessary in order to apply. 
                                                                                                                                     
98 See Debates, Wasylycia-Leis, supra note 13, at 1335–40. 
99 See id. 
100 See Kay, supra note 97.  
101 Id. 
102 See Christina Cotter, The Implications of Rwanda’s Paragraph 6 Agreement with Canada 
for Other Developing Countries, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L. L. REV. 177, 187 (2008). 
103 See Goodwin, supra note 55, at 582–83. 
104 See Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian 
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mod
e=1.  Paragraph 4(2) would revise Section 21.04(2) of the Canadian Patent Act.  See relevant 
language, infra APPENDIX, at 150–51. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 Id.  
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Thus, the proposed amendment would move CAMR’s application closer 
toward the Indian side of the spectrum.  As with the Indian provision, vague 
language in the CAMR provision may raise speculation on whether it is compliant 
with international agreements.108  In particular, the amendments to CAMR would 
delete the requirement to state the maximum quantity of pharmaceuticals that 
would be produced under the license.109  The 2003 Council Decision states that 
the importing country should notify the TRIPs Council of the expected quantity of 
the product.110  The TRIPs Council stated that a compulsory license shall be 
issued for “only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing 
Member(s) . . . .”111  Therefore, by deleting the need to state the maximum 
quantity of pharmaceuticals to be produced, the proposed amendment is not 
compliant with the TRIPs Agreement.112  Still, the implementation of the 
proposed changes may clarify compliance.  For example, application materials, 
including forms, are currently available on the CAMR website.113  If the 
Canadian government decides to continue this practice after the passage of the 
amendments, such materials may provide some clarity.  However, as the proposed 
amendment is written, compliance with the TRIPs Agreement requirements is not 
gua
requirements.”115  Again, the amendment appears to move CAMR towards the 
ranteed. 
The proposed amendments to CAMR would also change the conditions for 
granting a compulsory license.  Currently, the negotiating provision in CAMR 
requires a thirty day mandatory negotiation period with the patent holder.114  The 
proposed amendment would replace this requirement, stating that a compulsory 
license will be granted, “if the applicant has complied with the prescribed 
                                                                                                                                     
108 See Mueller, supra note 86, at 605 (noting India’s Section 92A’s silence on certain parts of 
the TRIPs Agreement compulsory licensing framework may raise questions as to its compliance).  
In addition to raising speculation about compliance, the creation of a vague provision may also 
lead
n 21.04(2) of the Canadian 
Pate nt language, infra APPENDIX, at 150–51. 
(a)(i), 2(b)(i).  
e Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.04(3)(c) (1985), available at http://laws. 
justi
ations/Publication.aspx? 
 to uncertainty in the application process, as illustrated by the Nepal/India example.  See Ng & 
Kohler, supra note 50, at 166–69.  
109 See Bill C-393, 40th Parl.  Paragraph 4(2) would revise Sectio
nt Act.  See releva
110 See 2003 Council Decision, supra note 30, ¶¶ 2
111 Id. ¶ 2(b)(i). 
112 See Debates, Garneau, supra note 15, at 1350. 
113 Government of Canada, Canadian Access to Medicines Regime, Forms, http://www.camr-
rcam.gc.ca/doc/form/index_e.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
114 Se
ce.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01; relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 
151–52. 
115 See Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian 
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, ¶ 
4(3), (1st reading 25 May 2009), http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublic
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Indian side of the spectrum.116  The vague language in the provision again raises 
questions about the adequacy of CAMR meeting international agreements.117  
TRIPs Article 31 allows for a waiver of the negotiation requirement, “in the case 
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of 
public non-commercial use.”118 
A general repeal of the negotiation requirement, along with repeal of a 
specific schedule of pharmaceuticals, leads to a waiver greater in scope than 
allowed by the TRIPs Agreement.119  In this respect, the proposed amendment 
could be seen as the opposite of current CAMR legislation.  The current CAMR 
goes beyond what is required in the TRIPs Agreement, by requiring a negotiation 
period of thirty days, with no option for a waiver.120  The proposed amendment 
would not only repeal the mandatory negotiation period, but would not require 
any negotiation whatsoever.121  Therefore, while the proposed repealing of the 
negotiation provision may be an effort to lessen the complexity of the current 
CAMR regime, it may go too far, leading to questions of compliance.122  
2. Balancing of Interests 
Apotex Inc. also criticized123 CAMR for attempting to balance the interests of 
large, brand name pharmaceutical companies to the detriment of the regime.124  
For example, the current CAMR allows for the patent holder to litigate for an 
                                                                                                                                     




ding of the bill in the Canadian House of Commons.  See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15, 
135
 at 1209.  
.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01; relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 
152.
ise Section 21.04(3) of the Canadian 
Pate t 151. 
(stating similar 
criti ric companies at the time of CAMR’s 2007 review).  
adian Patent Act.  See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 151–52. 
116 Compare Bill C-393, 40th Parl. (proposing changes to CAMR), with The Patents 
(Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15 of 2005; INDIA CODE (2005), available at http://i
ere Section 92A mirrors the language of the proposed changes in Bill C-393). 
117 See Mueller, supra note 86, at 603 (noting how India’s Section 92A’s silence regarding 
certain parts of the TRIPs Agreement compulsory licensing framework may raise questions as to 
its compliance).  The proposed amendment would leave CAMR silent on certain TRIPs 
Agreement requirements, leading to similar questions.  In fact, questions have been raised during 
the rea
0. 
118 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(b),
119 See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15, 1350. 
120 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.04(3)(c) (1985), available at http://laws. 
justice
  
121 See Bill C-393, 40th Parl.  Paragraph 4(3) would rev
nt Act.  See  relevant language, infra APPENDIX, a
122 See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15, at 1350. 
123 See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 2007 REPORT, supra note 65, at 18–19 
cisms by NGOs and gene
124 Kay, supra note 97.  
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increase in royalties.125  The proposed bills would repeal the section of CAMR 
which allows for the Canadian Federal Court to determine a larger royalty.126  
This proposed legislation may indicate a change in balancing these interests.  
Repealing the patent holders’ right to litigate for increased royalties would 





                                                                                                                                    
ation.  
However, repealing these requirements may render the amended CAMR non-
compliant with TRIPs Agreement requirements.128  Article 31 of the TRIPs 
Agreement requires that the patent holder receive adequate remuneration and that 
decisions regarding remuneration be reviewable by the courts or higher 
authority.129  Removing the right of the patent holder to litigate the issue of 
remuneration removes the review process as required by the TRIPs Agreement.130  
Therefore, the act of removing the royalty litigation provision, without provi
any other form of review, is not compliant with the TRIPs Agreement.  
In addition, the pharmaceutical industry would likely argue that removal of 
this subsection substantially decreases their rights as patent holders.  Pressure 
placed on the importing countries from pharmaceutical companies is one of the 
major reasons cited for the lack of success of the exportation of pharmaceuticals 
under compulsory licenses.132  Importing countries often depend on donations by 
developed countries to buy patented medicines from these nations’ 
pharmaceutical companies.133  Decreasing remedies available to the patent 
holders will likely not do anything to improve their opinion of the comp
 
125 See Canadian Patent Act, ch. P-4, § 21.08(4); relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 152. 
126 Bill C-393, 40th Parl.  Paragraph 8(2) would revise Section 21.08(4) of the Canadian 
Patent Act.  See  relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 152. 
127 See Penner & Armstrong, supra note 7, at 370 (noting that NGOs and generic companies 
criticized CAMR for the uncertainty brought to the regime by the royalty and validity provision).  
By repealing these provisions, the revised CAMR would appear to place emphasis on the 
applicants rather than on the rights holder. 
128 Debates, Garneu, supra note 15. 
129 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 31(h), at 1210 (“[T]he right holder shall be paid 
adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value 
of the authorization); 31(j), at 1210 (“[A]ny decision relating to the remuneration provided in 
respect of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct 
higher authority in that Member….”).  
130 See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15. 
131 Id.  
132 Cotter, supra note 102, at 187. 
133 See id. (quoting a health activist discussing the pressure from pharmaceutical companies, 
“[i]f I’m sitting here, and I’m in Malawi, and I’ve got $200 million annually from the U.S. for 
drugs as long as I buy patented drugs, do you think I’m going to thumb my nose at that?  It’s part 
of the bigger architecture”).  
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licensing s  may feel additional pressure not to use the 
reg
man
providing f it,140 or for an amount of pharmaceuticals that can be 
     
cheme, and applicants
imes. 
3. Lack of Incentives  
Another criticism of CAMR is the lack of incentives it provides for generic 
companies.134  The proposed legislation deals with one aspect of incentives: it 
allows generic companies to practice economies of scale.135  Under the proposed 
amendment to the application process, the application no longer has to state the 
maximum amount of product that will be produced.136  In addition, the time 
period requirement, which is currently a two-year term of production, which can 
be extended for another two years, would also be repealed.137  Therefore, generic 
ufacturers would potentially be able to produce a larger amount of medication 
at a lower cost to themselves and the respective importing county.138 
However, repealing the requirement to specify the maximum amount of 
pharmaceuticals to be produced and the time limit may lead to questions about the 
scope of the license.  Article 31, subdivision (c) of the TRIPs Agreement provides 
that a compulsory license should be limited in both scope and duration.139  By not 
or a time lim
                                                                                                                                
134 See id. at 187–88. 
135 See Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 
6 of Doha D  COMP. L. 
REV. 613, 70 ry):  
fits from economies of scale along the same 
ations/Publication.aspx? 
Doc
 APPENDIX, at 150–51. 
uld revise Section 21.09 of the Canadian Patent Act.  
See 
“under such terms and conditions as may be 
eclaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L &
3 (2004) (describing economies of scale as important to the generics indust
Economies of scale can be viewed from the perspective of either the 
producer or the purchaser.  From a producer perspective, increased 
production distributes fixed costs over a greater number of units, 
thereby reducing overall costs per unit.  Thus, the more that is produced 
and sold to consumers, the lower the average cost of producing that 
unit.  This acts as an incentive for producers to manufacture more units.  
The purchaser bene
premise, as purchasing more units decreases the per-unit cost.  Think of 
it as buying in bulk. 
See also Mike Gumbel, Is Article 31bis Enough? The Need to Promote Economies of Scale in 
the International Compulsory Licensing System, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 161, 172 (2008).  
136 Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian 
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, (1st 
reading 25 May 2009), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublic
Id=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1.  Paragraph 4(2) would revise Section 21.04(2) of the 
Canadian Patent Act.  See relevant language, infra
137 Bill C-393, 40th Parl.  Paragraph 9 wo
relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 152. 
138 See Gumbel, supra note 135, at 172.  
139 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(c), at 1209; Debates, Garneu, supra note 15. 
140 The Indian legislation similarly does not provide for a time limit; however Section 92A(2) 
provides that the Controller will grant a license, 
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produced, the proposed amendment would, in my opinion, significantly broaden 
the scope of the license.  Such a broad scope would not comport with the TRIPs 
Agr 141
mpliant with the TRIPs Agreement.142  
B. 
gislation and suggests that other countries 
sho
diagnostic kits.147  While it is unclear whether or not the proposed amendment 
                                                                                                                                    
eement.  
Although the proposed changes to CAMR attempt to remedy complaints 
levied at the current regime by NGOs and generic companies, the proposed 
changes remove much of the language from the current provisions, leading to a 
license that is broader in scope.  In fact, the scope of the amended provisions 
would be so broad as to render them nonco
Positive Proposed Changes to CAMR 
While many changes to CAMR broaden the scope of the compulsory license 
to a point that is not compliant with the TRIPs Agreement, several proposed 
amendments reflect positive changes.  This section compares these changes to 
other nations’ compulsory licensing le
uld consider their implementation. 
For example, the proposed amendment takes a positive step in broadening the 
definition of pharmaceuticals.143  The proposed legislation would change the 
definition of pharmaceutical products eligible for the license from those listed in 
Schedule 1.144  The proposed legislation would define pharmaceuticals as, “any 
drug, as defined in section 2 of the Food and Drugs Act, and includes monitoring 
products and products used in conjunction with a pharmaceutical product.”145  In 
addition, the proposed amendment would allow for the manufacture of active 
ingredients.146  The 2003 Council Decision stated that active ingredients should 
be included in a definition of pharmaceutical products; however it also included 
 
spec d published by him.”  The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 92A(2); INDIA 
COD
 be produced—as rendering Canada in “default of its 
inte
 Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, ¶ 2 
(1st
2 would revise Section 21.02 of the 
Can IX, at 148. 
146 See B e Canadian 
Patent Act.  S
147 See 2
ified an
E (2005), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/.  
141 See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15. 
142 Id. 
143 But see Debates, Garneu, supra note 15 (criticizing the repealing of Schedule 1 of CAMR 
—the list of eligible pharmaceuticals to
rnational trade treaty obligations under the TRIPS agreement.”). 
144 Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, Schedule 1 (1985), available at http://laws.justice. 
gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-20.html#anchorsc:1. 
145 Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian 
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d
 reading 25 May 2009), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication. 
aspx?DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1.  Paragraph 
adian Patent Act.  See relevant language, infra APPEND
ill C-393, 40th Parl.  Paragraph 4(1) would revise Section 21.04(1.1) of th
ee relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 148. 
003 Council Decision , supra note 30, ¶ 1(a): 
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would include diagnostic kits,148 broadening the definition of pharmaceuticals can 
be seen as a positive step, embodying the spirit of the 2003 Council Decision. 
The European Union (EU) and the Republic of Korea, have already 
implemented flexible definitions that include active ingredients and diagnostic 
kits.149  A broad, flexible definition of pharmaceutical products is critical in 
providing for better access to medicines, as illustrated by Apotex’s experiences 
under the current CAMR.  Apotex had difficulty with obtaining a compulsory 
license under the current CAMR because the desired pharmaceuticals were not 
included on Schedule 1, the list of approved pharmaceuticals of CAMR.150  
Because providing better access to medicines is a vital purpose of the Doha 
Declaration,151 countries should provide for a broad definition of pharmaceutical 
products to allow for such access.152  The proposed legislation clearly broadens 
the definition of pharmaceuticals, and is thus a positive step. 
Furthermore, another positive change that the proposed legislation presents is 
redefining which countries are eligible to apply for a compulsory license under 
CAMR.  Under the proposed legislation, eligible parties would be countries 
recognized by the United Nations as least developed countries, or named by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) as eligible 
for official development assistance.153  The current CAMR, in discussing eligible 
                                                                                                                                     
‘pharmaceutical product’ means any patented product, or product 
manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector 
needed to address the public health problems as recognized in 
paragraph 1 of the Declaration.  It is understood that active ingredients 
necessary for its manufacture and diagnostic kits needed for its use 
would be included . . . . 
148 While diagnostic kits are not specifically mentioned in the proposed definition, the 
amended definition would include, “products used in conjunction with a pharmaceutical product.”  
Bill C-393, ¶ 2.  This could possibly be construed as a diagnostic kit.  Paragraph 4(1) would revise 
Section 21.04(1.1) of the Canadian Patent Act.   
149 Council Regulation 816/2006, art. 2(1), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:157:0001:0007:EN:PDF; Republic of 
Korea Patent Act (amended 2005), No. 950, art. 107(8), available at http://lists.essential.org/ 
pipermail/ip-health/2005-November/008728.html. 
150 See Tsai, supra note 10, at 1077.  
151 Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 3, at 746.  
152 See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 155 (suggesting that the best definition of 
pharmaceutical products is “Norway’s Regulations, section 108, which define ‘pharmaceutical 
products’ as those ‘covered by paragraph 1 (a) of the General Council Decision.’”). 
153 Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian 
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009,  3(1) 
(1st reading 25 May 2009), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication. 
aspx?DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1.  Paragraph 3(1) would revise Section 21.03(1) of 
the Canadian Patent Act.  See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 148. 
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participants in the regime, distinguishes between countries that are members of 
the WTO and those that are not.154  The proposed amendment would remove this 
distinction.155  This change would put CAMR more in line with India’s 
legislation.156  India has been praised for not making this distinction.157  In 
contrast, the Republic of Korea’s law requires a showing of “insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity” of non-WTO members who are not least developed 
nati 158
’s WTO status can be 
see
ons, essentially requiring more of non-WTO member countries.  
While the 2003 Council Decision discusses importing countries as “eligible 
importing Member,”159  India and the EU have not limited their compulsory 
licensing provisions to WTO member nations.160  In addition, civil society 
advocates argue that the 2003 Council Decision does not limit nations in choosing 
to provide for exportation to non-WTO member nations.161  Because access to 
medicines is considered part of the fundamental right to human health by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, distinctions should not be created with 
respect to a nation’s WTO membership status.162  Thus, the proposed legislation’s 
deletion of consideration of a prospective importing nation
n as a positive step that other countries should consider. 
                                                                                                                                     
154 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 21.03(1)(b) (1985), available at 
http
 Committee’s list.  Council Regulation 
816
.  
discussing the Korean provision, which requires that non-WTO members 
must apacity and what constitutes sufficient 
evid
a’s Legislation on Compulsory Licensing 
of P
://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01; relevant language, infra 
APPENDIX, at 148–49. 
155 See Bill C-393, 40th Parl., ¶ 3(1).  Paragraph 3(1) would revise Section 21.03(1) of the 
Canadian Patent Act.  See relevant language, infra APPENDIX, at 148–49. 
156 The Indian legislation would remain broader, only requiring that a country have 
insufficient manufacturing capacity.  The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 92A; 
INDIA CODE (2005), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/.  In addition, the EU also includes 
countries named on the OECD Development Assistance
/2006, art. 4(c), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:157:0001:0007:EN:PDF
157 See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 153 (noting that access to medicines is a fundamental 
right that should not be based on WTO membership).  
158 Republic of Korea Patent Act (amended 2005), No. 950, art. 107(7)(ii), available at: 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2005-November/008728.html.  See Ng & Kohler, 
supra note 50, at 153 (
 show sufficient evidence of lack of manufacturing c
ence is not clear).  
159 See 2003 Council Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 1(b).  
160 See supra text accompanying note 155. 
161 See Richard Elliot, Pledges and Pitfalls: Canad
harmaceuticals for Export, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 94, 104 (2006). 
162 See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50, at 151–53.  
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Another positive proposal broadens the ability of an importing country to re-
export the drugs produced under the compulsory license.163  This proposed 
amendment is an implementation of Paragraph 6(i) of the 2003 Council 
Decision.164  The implementation of the proposed amendment can be seen as both 
compliant with the TRIPs Agreement and helpful to incentivize generic 
companies to use the CAMR regime.165  A similar provision can also be found in 
EU legislation.166  The Dutch and Indian provisions are silent on the issue of re-
importation, which may lead to uncertainty among importing 167nations.   
Therefore, nations should imple
licensed pharmaceuticals, as sug  Council Decision.  
                                                                                                                                    
ment a provision allowing for regional trade of the 
gested by the 2003
 
at is not listed in the 




ature of the patent rights in question . . . . 
th.), available at 
http ules.html; The Patents (Amendment) Act, 
No. vailable at http://indiacode.nic.in/. 
163 See Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian 
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, ¶ 
12(4), (1st reading 25 May 2009), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/ 
Publication.aspx?DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1 (“Paragraph (1)(g) does not apply if a 
product is exported to a party to a relevant regional trade agreement th
edule for re-export to parties to the agreement th
add language to Section 21.14 of the Canadian Patent Act.  
Council Decision , supra note 30, ¶ 6(i): 
With a view to harnessing economies of scale for the purposes of 
enhancing purchasing power for, and facilitating the local production 
of, pharmaceutical products: (i) where a developing or least-developed 
country WTO Member is a party to a regional trade agreement within 
the meaning of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Decision of 28 
November 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (L/4903), 
at least half of the current membership of which is made up of countries 
presently on the United Nations list of least developed countries, the 
obligation of that Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement 
shall be waived to the extent necessary to enable a pharmaceutical 
product produced or imported under a compulsory license in that 
Member to be exported to the markets of those other developing or 
least developed country parties to the regional trade agreement th
share the health problem in question. It is understood that this will not 
prejudice the territorial n
165 Allowing for re-exportation to regional trading partners allows generic manufactures to 
practice economies of scale.  See id.  
166 See Council Regulation 816/2006, art. 10(4), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EC),  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:157:0001:0007:EN:PDF.   
167 Rijksoctrooiwet 1995 [Patent Act 1995], art. 57(1), Stb. 1995, 51 (Ne
://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/netherlands-export-r
15 of 2005, § 92A; INDIA CODE (2005), a
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, Canadian bills C-393 and S-232 attempt to address many of the 
criticisms of the current CAMR.168  However, in addressing these concerns, the 
proposed legislation creates a process that may not be compliant with the TRIPs 
Agr
 t e distinction between WTO member nations and non-WTO member 
nati
 on the initiative of 
gen
                                                                                                                                    
eement.169  Specifically, the proposed legislation removes certain language in 
the current CAMR, creating a vague regime that can be compared to the Indian 
scheme under Section 92A of the Indian Patents Act.170  The proposed legislation 
is likely to be contentious with patent holders, as it removes the negotiation 
requirement and the ability for the patent holder to litigate for increased royalties. 
Despite these apparent issues, the proposed legislation puts forward several 
positive changes that would create a better regime.  A broader definition of 
pharmaceuticals is a positive change that would codify the spirit of the Doha 
Declaration,171 and incorporate elements of the 2003 Council Decision.172  
Removing h
ons would increase access to medicines and, therefore, would be in line with 
the Doha Declaration.173  Lastly, allowing an importing country to re-export the 
licensed pharmaceuticals as part of a regional trade agreement would also be a 
positive step by directly implementing a provision of the 2003 Council 
Decision.174 
Taking the above into account, the proposed legislation should not pass as it is 
currently drafted.  However, the Canadian government could try to increase use of 
CAMR by other means.  The 2007 government sponsored review of CAMR 
discussed efforts of the Canadian government to tackle the issue of access to 
medicines, including publicizing CAMR.175  However, Apotex, in discussing their 
experiences with CAMR, noted that currently CAMR relied
eric manufacturers, but that the government should take the lead.176  The 
Canadian government may want to rethink their allocation of resources with 
respect to CAMR.  For example, while the Canadian government has raised 
 
168 See Debates, Wasylycia-Leis, supra note 13.   
ion surrounding the compulsory 
licen , at 166.  
48–49.  
NADA, 2007 REPORT, supra note 65. 
169 See Debates, Garneu, supra note 15.  
170 The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 92A; INDIA CODE (2005), available at 
http://indiacode.nic.in/.  In creating a vague regime, the proposed legislation may also create 
problems similar to those experienced by India, that is, litigat
sing applications.  See Ng & Kohler, supra note 50
171 Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 3, at 746. 
172 2003 Council Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 1(a). 
173 See Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 17, at 7
174 2003 Council Decision, supra note 30, ¶ 6(i).  
175 See GOVERNMENT OF CA
176 See Kay, supra note 97. 
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awareness of the existence of CAMR, the government could direct more resources 
towards navigating the complexities of the regime. 
While developing nations may be wary of losing donations from 
pharmaceutical companies, potential importing nations may also want to look at 
the example of Brazil, which has used the threat of compulsory licensing as 
leverage to get pharmaceutical companies to lower their prices.177  Therefore, a 
developing nation may not even need to complete the CAMR process to obtain 
better access to pharmaceuticals. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
177 See Greenbaum, supra note 8, at 154. 
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APPENDIX  
CURRENT CANADIAN ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES REGIME AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS  
 
 




Bill C-393179 and Bill S-232180
21.02 The definitions in this section apply in 
this section and in sections 21.03 to 21.19. 
 
“pharmaceutical product” means any patented 
product listed in Schedule 1 in, if applicable, 
the dosage form, the strength and the route of 
administration specified in that Schedule in 
relation to the product. 
2. Section 21.02 of the Act is replaced by the 
following: 
 
210.02 The definitions in this section apply in 
sections 21.01 to 21.16. 
“authorization” means an authorization granted 
under subsection 21.04(1). 
“pharmaceutical product” means any drug, as 
defined in section 2 of the Food and Drugs Act, 
and includes monitoring products and products 
used in conjunction with a pharmaceutical 
product. 
21.03 (1) The Governor in Council may, by 
order, 
 
[Section (a) not included] 
(b) on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International 
Trade and the Minister for International 
Cooperation, amend Schedule 2 by adding the 
name of any country recognized by the United 
3. (1) Subsections 21.03(1) and (2) of the Act 
are replaced by the following: 
 
21.03 (1) The Governor in Council may, by 
order, on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International 
Trade and the Minister for International 
Cooperation, amend the Schedule to add the 
name of a country if the country is 
(a) recognized by the United Nations as being a 
                                                                                                                                     
178  Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, §§ 21.01-21.2 (1985), available at http://laws. 
justice.gc.ca/eng/P-4/page-6.html#anchorbo-ga:s_21_01.  The current CAMR regime provisions 
have been edited for brevity, but include all Sections relevant to this paper.  The original emphasis 
remains.  
179 Bill C-393, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian 
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, (1st 
reading 25 May 2009), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx? 
DocId=4329904&Language=e&Mode=1. 
180 Bill S-232, An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian 
purposes) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, 
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/Senate/Bills/402/public/S-232/S-232_1/S-232_text-
e.htm.  The proposed amendments have been edited for brevity but include all passages relevant to 
this paper.  The original emphasis has been left in.  Language that is underlined indicates new 
language to be inserted. 
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Current CAMR178  
 
Proposed Amendments: 
Bill C-393179 and Bill S-232180  
Nations as being a least-developed country 
that has, 
 (i) if it is a WTO Member, provided the 
TRIPS Council with a notice in writing stating 
that the country intends to import, in 
accordance with the General Council 
Decision, pharmaceutical products, as defined 
in paragraph 1(a) of that decision, and 
(ii) if it is not a WTO Member, provided the 
Government of Canada with a notice in 
writing through diplomatic channels stating 
that the country intends to import 
pharmaceutical products, as defined in 
paragraph 1(a) of the General Council 
Decision, that it agrees that those products 
will not be used for commercial purposes and 
that it undertakes to adopt the measures 
referred to in Article 4 of that decision; 
(c) on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International 
Trade and the Minister for International 
Cooperation, amend Schedule 3 by adding the 
name of any WTO Member not listed in 
Schedule 2 that has provided the TRIPS 
Council with a notice in writing stating that 
the WTO Member intends to import, in 
accordance with the General Council 
Decision, pharmaceutical products, as defined 
in paragraph 1(a) of that decision; and 
(d) on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International 
Trade and the Minister for International 
Cooperation, amend Schedule 4 by adding the 
name of 
(i) any WTO Member not listed in Schedule 2 
or 3 that has provided the TRIPS Council with 
a notice in writing stating that the WTO 
Member intends to import, in accordance with 
least-developed country; or 
(b) named on the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s list of 






Cybaris®, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol1/iss1/5
[1:124 2010] CYBARIS™, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 150 
 
Current CAMR178  
 
Proposed Amendments: 
Bill C-393179 and Bill S-232180  
the General Council Decision, pharmaceutical 
products, as defined in paragraph 1(a) of that 
decision, or 
(ii) any country that is not a WTO Member 
and that is named on the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
list of countries that are eligible for official 
development assistance and that has provided 
the Government of Canada with a notice in 
writing through diplomatic channels 
(A) stating that it is faced with a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, 
(B) specifying the name of the pharmaceutical 
product, as defined in paragraph 1(a) of the 
General Council Decision, and the quantity of 
that product, needed by the country to deal 
with the emergency or other urgency, 
(C) stating that it has no, or insufficient, 
pharmaceutical capacity to manufacture that 
product, and 
(D) stating that it agrees that that product will 
not be used for commercial purposes and that 
it undertakes to adopt the measures referred to 
in Article 4 of the General Council Decision.  
[Subsection (2 ) not included] 
This language represents a new Subsection 
that has no counterpart in the current CAMR. 
4. (1) Subsection 21.04(1) of the Act is 
replaced by the following: 
(1.1) In addition to what is authorized under 
subsection (1), an authorization under that 
subsection authorizes the person to 
(a) manufacture any active ingredient used in 
the manufacture of a finished product; and 
(b) make, construct and use any patented 
invention solely for the purpose of 
manufacturing any active pharmaceutical 
ingredient used in the manufacture of a finished 
27
Huth: The Best of Intentions: Why the Proposed Changes to the Canadian
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
[1:124 2010] Note: The Best of Intentions: Why the Proposed 151 
 Changes to the Canadian Access to Medicines 
 Regime Should Not Be Implemented 
 
Current CAMR178  
 
Proposed Amendments: 
Bill C-393179 and Bill S-232180  
product. 
 
21.04(2) The application must be in the 
prescribed form and set out 
(a) the name of the pharmaceutical product to 
be manufactured and sold for export under the 
authorization; 
(b) prescribed information in respect of the 
version of the pharmaceutical product to be 
manufactured and sold for export under the 
authorization; 
(c) the maximum quantity of the 
pharmaceutical product to be manufactured 
and sold for export under the authorization; 
(d) for each patented invention to which the 
application relates, the name of the patentee 
of the invention and the number, as recorded 
in the Patent Office, of the patent issued in 
respect of that invention; 
(e) the name of the country or WTO Member 
to which the pharmaceutical product is to be 
exported; 
(f) the name of the governmental person or 
entity, or the person or entity permitted by the 
government of the importing country, to 
which the product is to be sold, and prescribed 
information, if any, concerning that person or 
entity; and 
(g) any other information that may be 
prescribed.  
 
4.(2) Subsection 21.04(2) of the Act is 
amended by adding “and” at the end of 
paragraph (a) and by repealing paragraphs 
(b) to (f). 
21.04 Conditions for granting of 
authorization 
(3) The Commissioner shall authorize the use 
of the patented invention only if 
4.(3) Subsection 21.04(3) of the Act is 
replaced by the following: 
 
(3) The Commissioner shall grant an 
authorization only if the applicant has complied 
with the prescribed requirements. 
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Current CAMR178  
 
Proposed Amendments: 
Bill C-393179 and Bill S-232180  
(a) the applicant has complied with the 
prescribed requirements, if any; 
(b) the Minister of Health has notified the 
Commissioner that the version of the 
pharmaceutical product that is named in the 
application meets the requirements of the 
Food and Drugs Act and its regulations, 
including the requirements under those 
regulations relating to the marking, 
embossing, labeling [sic] and packaging that 
identify that version of the product as having 
been manufactured [subsections (i) and (ii) 
not included] 
 (c) the applicant provides the Commissioner 
with a solemn or statutory declaration in the 
prescribed form stating that the applicant had, 
at least thirty days before filing the 
application, 
(i) sought from the patentee or, if there is 
more than one, from each of the patentees, by 
certified or registered mail, a licence to 
manufacture and sell the pharmaceutical 
product for export to the country or WTO 
Member named in the application on 
reasonable terms and conditions and that such 
efforts have not been successful, and 
(ii) provided the patentee, or each of the 
patentees, as the case may be, by certified or 
registered mail, in the written request for a 
licence, with the information that is in all 
material respects identical to the information 
referred to in paragraphs (2)(a) to (g); and 
[Section (d) not included] 
 
 
21.08 Federal Court may determine royalty 
(4) The Federal Court may, in relation to any 
authorization, make an order providing for the 
payment of a royalty that is greater than the 
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Current CAMR178  
 
Proposed Amendments: 
Bill C-393179 and Bill S-232180  
royalty that would otherwise be required to be 
paid under subsection (1).  
 
21.09 An authorization granted under 
subsection 21.04(1) is valid for a period of 
two years beginning on the day on which the 
authorization is granted. 
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